MILO · Mining, lobbying and efficient environmental policy
Horizon 2020 — Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions
- Duration
- 2017-12-01 → 2019-12-28
- EU contribution
- €180,277
- Participants
- 2
- Scheme
- MSCA-IF-EF-ST
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Results in brief
Mining, lobbying and efficient environmental policy
The project had two main objectives. First objective was to investigate the choice of environmental policy instruments, like emission tax, in the context of polluting exhaustible resource extraction. Exhaustible resource extraction, including mining for metals, is polluting and often results in a polluted site after the extraction ends. Therefore the focus of this research was on the extraction stage and the reclamation or closure stage of a mine. Without any regulation in the form of environmental policy, the extraction operation produces too much pollution which is detrimental both to human well-being and to ecosystems. The project developed understanding on the economic regulation of mining to curtail emission generation by focusing on the properties of the emission tax and reclamation payments in addition to the analysis of enforcement issues. The second objective was to analyse environmental policy instruments in a political economy context where the polluters can influence the policy maker's instrument choice. The goal was to extend the current literature on the choice of environmental policy instruments under lobbying by focusing on the firms' incentives to join the lobby group and by investigating the consequences of this to instrument choice. In addition, the research looked into how an aggregate emission quota is formed and divided when the polluters lobby the policy maker.
Data: CORDIS, © European Union
Project objective
Natural resources including raw materials are important for the European Union since they are a part of the base of the economy and simultaneously a large pollution and waste source. Sustainable development of the mining sector extracting the raw materials calls for an economic analysis of environmental policy, which is the central theme of the MILO-project. The objective of the project is to investigate the optimal environmental policy of the mining sector with a special emphasis on mining specific features and the choice of policy instruments under lobbying. Through its research results obtained using dynamic optimization methods, game theory and an array of dissemination and communication efforts, the project will help to improve the currently applied policies in Europe. In addition to policy advice, the project will result in new insights on the formation of lobby groups and policy instruments by combining two game theoretical approaches, namely, the common agency framework and coalition theory modeling. The researcher, who is trained in the theory of environmental policy instruments and dynamic optimization methods, will conduct the research and training in FEEM’s international and interdisciplinary working environment and will be supervised by an expert in the research field. The project with its trainings improves his research and transferable skills, and extends his international networks through the host’s contacts and through a research visit. By including versatile training-through-research, multiple dissemination and communication methods, public engagement through the MILO-webpage and blog, and networking the project has a strong impact on the researcher’s career, on the future research collaboration as well as on the public interest.
Original text from CORDIS.
Participants
Links
- View on CORDIS
- DOI: 10.3030/748066
- https://arquivo.pt/wayback/20201229191756/https://www.unive.it/pag/33123/
Data: CORDIS, © European Union