JBinBA · Joint Bodies in Bilateral Agreements
Horizon 2020 — Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions
- Duration
- 2019-10-01 → 2022-10-01
- EU contribution
- €186,167
- Participants
- 1
- Scheme
- MSCA-IF
Lines connect the coordinator with its partners.
Results in brief
Joint Bodies in Bilateral Agreements
One of the EU's key functions is to represent its 27 member states in international negotiations. For example, the EU has ‘exclusive’ competences in trade, which means that EU member states cannot conclude trade agreements on their own but have to rely on the European Commission to negotiate them. Also outside trade, the Commission often takes the lead in international negotiations, such as when concluding fisheries or cooperation agreements. These international agreements spell important consequences for citizens in the EU and in third countries. For example, trade agreements may subject some businesses inside the EU to increased foreign competition but help other EU businesses to sell their goods and services abroad. At the same time, gaining access to the EU’s huge single market can help businesses in third countries. Still, all international agreements not only need to be concluded – they also need to be implemented. For example, certain provisions in agreements are very complex to turn into practice and may require further discussions among the EU and third country. Or new issues may come up, which have not been anticipated at the time of the negotiations. To meet this demand for continued discussions, agreements often set up what we call ‘joint bodies’ (JBs). The names of these JBs vary, but examples include association councils (e.g., the EU-Turkey Association Council), cooperation councils (e.g., the EU-Uzbekistan Cooperation Council), joint committees (e.g., the CETA Joint Committee) or also joint working groups (e.g., the Joint Technical Working Group on nuclear energy with the USA). Overall, we identified almost 300 international agreements concluded by the EU since 1992 that set up at least one JB. Beyond meeting regularly, discussing problems, and issuing recommendations, half of them can even take decisions or amend agreements. Another interesting aspect of JBs is that they, generally, put the European Commission in a good position to shape EU external relations. International agreements are often broad, which means that JBs can have an impact on many different areas. The Commission usually plays a key role in JBs. In about three quarters of them, for example, the Commission represents the EU. In 40 percent, it only needs support from a (qualified) majority of EU member states to define the EU position for JB meetings. Overall, the Commission is the primary beneficiary of JBs, enabling it to defend and promote EU interests during the implementation of international agreements. In summary, this project made a significant contribution to our understanding of JBs. While it has come to an end, our interest in studying JBs is stronger than ever. For a continuously updated summary of our efforts to better understand JBs, please visit http://markus-gastinger.eu/joint-bodies/.
Data: CORDIS, © European Union
Project objective
This project will put a spotlight on joint bodies (JBs), which refers to common institutions set up between the European Union (EU) and third countries through their bilateral agreements. They bring together representatives from the EU (Commission and/or Council) and the third country to oversee implementation. Beyond the ability to discuss common problems and issue recommendations, they are sometimes even empowered to amend the agreement or adopt binding decisions, which raises concerns about their democratic legitimacy. Although the number of JBs run into the hundreds and their decision-making powers attract increasing attention, our knowledge about them is limited. This project would help to significantly narrow this discrepancy.The objective of this project is to explain Commission discretion in these bodies. We draw on principal–agent theory to highlight that, in designing international institutions, states rationally weigh expected benefits of delegation against expected costs. We argue that the size of agency losses is determined by whether agreements are concluded in an area of high politics, the need for policy expertise, the duration of an agreement, and the underlying decision rule among principals. In terms of third-country characteristics, we theorize that size and regime type (democracy) play a role in states’ determination of agency losses. To test these expectations, we will first generate an original dataset mapping JBs across ca. 550 bilateral agreements and primarily use regression analyses, albeit with some qualitative evidence from interviews to corroborate the causal mechanisms. Second, we will use stratified random sampling to conduct a survey among at least 100 Commission officials active in JBs and interpret the data employing both quantitative and qualitative methods.This project will be empirically innovative, theoretically informed, and methodologically rigorous and produce findings relevant for scholars, policy makers, and citizens.
Original text from CORDIS.
Participants
- PARIS-LODRON-UNIVERSITAT SALZBURG · SalzburgCoordinatorAustria
Links
Data: CORDIS, © European Union