FP7Реинтеграция2011–2014

IDEALIZATIONS · The Epistemic Role of Scientific Idealization

7РП — „Хора“ (Действия „Мария Кюри“)

Период
2011-12-15 → 2014-12-14
Финансиране от ЕС
75 000 €
Участници
1
Схема
MC-CIG

Линиите свързват координатора с партньорите.

Накратко на български

Научните идеализации във физиката, като моделите с безкрайни стойности, се анализират за това дали точно представят причинно-следствените връзки в природата. Това помага да се разбере как опростените модели постигат обективност и кога резултатите им са надеждни спрямо реалните наблюдения.

Този кратък обзор е генериран от изкуствен интелект

Кратко обяснение, генерирано от езиков модел по текста на CORDIS. Оригиналът е по-долу.

Резултати накратко

The Epistemic Role of Scientific Idealization

The research carried out in this project identifies and clarifies, on the one hand, previously overlooked tensions between the causal approach to scientific explanation and typical idealization procedures in physics. In particular, it argues that at least some idealized models of natural phenomena (i.e., models involving infinite idealizations) fail to represent relevant causal factors in the physical systems of interest. On the other hand, the research enhances our understanding of the role of idealization in pursuing scientific objectivity. It points out that idealized models of natural phenomena introduce non­contentual elements of discourse, which renders them independent from the subjective appreciation of causal content. It also emphasizes that a careful analysis of widespread idealization procedures in physics indicates the need for a new conception of scientific objectivity which overcomes certain limits of the widely­ advocated criterion of structural invariance. The research ultimately develops a new conception of scientific idealization which contends, despite views to the contrary, that idealization can serve both scientific objectivity and understanding. More specifically, it claims that one condition under which idealization can do this is expressed by the notion of idealization control (which obtains if one can prove that the deviation of theoretical results from actual observations is smaller than may be due to experimental error). The research focuses in particular on the relation between idealization control and semantic indeterminacy, and draws naturalistic conclusions about modal ontology. Work on this project was done at the Center for Logic, Philosophy and History of Science at the University of Bucharest, Department of Theoretical Philosophy, and resulted in over 20 invited talks and contributed presentations at international scientific conferences; several articles and chapters published or forthcoming in top international journals and presses (e.g., Synthese, History and Philosophy of Logic, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, Foundations of Physics, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Western Ontario Studies in Philosophy of Science); organization of numerous international workshops; and newly designed courses and seminars for both undergraduates and graduate students in Bucharest. The research output is relevant primarily to academic philosophers working in philosophy of science and philosophy of physics, but may also be interesting to the large intellectual public.

Текст от CORDIS, на английски · Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз

Цел на проекта

In the contemporary philosophy of science, attention has been increasingly paid to the role of idealization in providing objective and genuine knowledge about natural phenomena, that is, knowledge that ascertains their mind-independent reality and also helps us to understand why they occur in the way they do. The main objectives of the present project are (1) the critical evaluation of the current views about scientific idealization that attempt to account for this role, and (2) the proposal of a new position about the ways in which idealization serves objectivity and understanding in physics, a position that overcomes the shortcomings of the current views.With regard to (1), I focus on two recent influential attempts to accommodate idealization within a causal account of scientific explanation, by Michael Strevens and James Woodward, as well as on one equally recent and influential attempt, by James Ladyman and Steven French, to justify the view that objective knowledge requires that the structure of a theory be invariant.With regard to (2), I build on the work of David Hilbert in the foundations of mathematics and physics. My goal is to explain in what sense idealization may be considered capable of providing objective and genuine scientific knowledge, without revealing the causes of natural phenomena, and without adverting to the notion of structural invariance.

Оригинален текст от CORDIS (на английски).

Участници

  • UNIVERSITATEA DIN BUCURESTI · BucurestiКоординаторРумъния

Връзки

Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз