CPAD · A Comparative Perspective on Parliamentary Legislative Activity and Bureaucratic Delegation
7РП — „Хора“ (Действия „Мария Кюри“)
- Период
- 2012-03-01 → 2016-02-29
- Финансиране от ЕС
- 100 000 €
- Участници
- 1
- Схема
- MC-CIG
Линиите свързват координатора с партньорите.
Накратко на български
Разпределението на властта между парламентаристите и държавните служители в Германия, Франция, Великобритания, Ирландия и Турция показва как се делегират задачите за управление. Това помага да се разбере дали представителита на народа контролират ефективно администрацията и пазят обществения интерес.
Кратко обяснение, генерирано от езиков модел по текста на CORDIS. Оригиналът е по-долу.
Резултати накратко
A Comparative Perspective on Parliamentary Legislative Activity and Bureaucratic Delegation
It might be argued that democracy is little more than a chain of delegation. The power to dictate the rules governing society are transferred from voters to elected legislators, from parliamentarians to the executive and from this executive to agencies within the state. Delegation is a division of labor and a political necessity in modern society (Braun, 2006). Yet, the potential problems of delegating authority were acknowledged as early as Montesquieu, that is if the relationship between citizens and their representatives in parliament is to be viewed as legitimate, there must be accountability binding the representative to the public will. Principal Agent theory views this as a problem of contracting, recognizing that there is rarely a perfect harmony of interests between the instance delegating authority (the principal) and the instance accepting representation of these interests (the agent). The two central problems involve adverse selection (should the principle choose this agent for the task at hand) and moral hazard (what happens if the principal cannot monitor the agent’s behavior perfectly). This project addresses how differences in the preferences of the legislating actors and the degree of institutional control over bureaucrats affect changes in the extent of policy delegation in five parliamentary systems: Germany, France, Great Britain, Ireland and Turkey. Theoretical research on this topic has advanced for presidential systems, but empirical research in parliamentary remains limited. This empirical study has tested, extended and refined the transaction cost, principal-agent theory based on divided government in the US presidential system for parliamentary democracies (see Epstein/ O’Halloran 1999). Studying parliamentary systems from a comparative perspective as suggested here is a demanding undertaking, requiring numerous resources and a thorough understanding of the political environment in each country, and the current project established (and will publicly release) a broad legislative database, for these different parliamentary democracies across all policy issues over the last twenty years. This project attempted to link bureaucratic policy delegation to the institutional design of a given system and to specific preference constellation and political considerations such as popular legitimacy. Understanding these relationships will contribute to the design of institutions and reform recommendations. Finally, the project provides an in-depth qualitative analysis of specific cases of policy delegation in support of the quantitative analysis.
Текст от CORDIS, на английски · Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз
Цел на проекта
In all parliamentary democracies, governments delegate some policymaking competence to bureaucrats. The very conception of cabinet governments comprised of ministers, who are derived from the party majorities and held in toe with the party line, implies a certain overlap between the executive and legislature. Policy delegation in both presidential and parliamentary systems may be motivated by limited resources, informational asymmetries and a desire to gain from bureaucratic expertise, but it also creates a certain moral hazard by granting bureaucrats the opportunity to act against the legislative preferences of the parliament. Parliamentary legislation can limit the potential for this drift, but also comes at the cost of less informed, more cumbersome legislation and the less efficient use of parliamentary resources. The propensity of decision makers to delegate vary widely across political systems and policy areas. This project asks how differences in the preferences of the legislating actors and the degree of institutional control over bureaucrats may affect the extent of policy delegation in four parliamentary systems (Germany, UK, France and Turkey).Although theoretical approaches to this topic abound, empirical research remains starkly limited. This project will test, extend and refine the transaction cost, principal-agent theory based on divided government in the US presidential system with a comparative perspective on parliamentary democracies. The selected countries vary with regard to their electoral systems, party tradition, level of democratic consolidation and legal tradition. The project will assess the relative potential for and intervening factors limiting or encouraging the use of executive policy instruments in these states over a twenty-five year period. This approach will link bureaucratic delegation to institutional design and political considerations such as popular legitimacy and preference constellations of legislating actors.
Оригинален текст от CORDIS (на английски).
Участници
- SABANCI UNIVERSITESI · IstanbulКоординаторТурция
Връзки
Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз