H2020Индивидуална стипендия2015–2017

Carnap and the Limits of Metaphysics · Carnap and the Limits of Metaphysics

„Хоризонт 2020“ — Действия „Мария Склодовска-Кюри“

Период: 2015-08-31 → 2017-08-30
Финансиране от ЕС: 183 455 €
Участници: 1
Схема: MSCA-IF-EF-RI

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Накратко на български

Метафизиката и нейните граници се изследват чрез въпроса дали можем да оправдаем философски хипотези, дори когато нямаме конкретни доказателства за тях. Това помага за създаването на стабилни основи за познанието както във философията, така и в науките.

Този кратък обзор е генериран от изкуствен интелект

Кратко обяснение, генерирано от езиков модел по текста на CORDIS. Оригиналът е по-долу.

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Carnap and the Limits of Metaphysics

The project was located at the intersection of metaphysics and epistemology. Metaphysics is about what there is, and the nature of what there is. Famously, the logical positivists of the Vienna circle argued that there are no good answers to metaphysical questions, and that philosophy should be in the business of eliminating metaphysics. The history of philosophy has gone in the other direction, with metaphysics becoming increasingly important in recent years. But the challenges raised by the logical positivists have never been satisfactorily answered. The project aimed to address the challenge head on. This required identifying and formulating the central challenge to metaphysics – that philosophical hypotheses agree about the evidence, and so there is no rational way to decide between them. The project developed a view of a priori justification according to which belief in some hypotheses could be justified without any evidence. These a priori beliefs provide the foundation on which empirical beliefs can be built as evidence is acquired. Thus the project was focussed on establishing firm foundations for inquiry in both philosophy and in the sciences. In this way the project revived a tradition of formal articulation of the scope and limits of inquiry initiated in Europe in the early twentieth century. The researcher had spent the last 13 years studying and working in the US, Australia and Canada. While this had allowed him to establish a large network of contacts, he had relatively few in Europe. The project helped him reintegrate into the European philosophical community and connect his European and international networks. The project also progressed the researcher’s career by making metaphysics a core strength and by connecting his existing expertise in epistemology with issues central to metaphysics. By bringing together and exploring the interactions between two of the most progressive areas of philosophy of the past decade, it positioned the researcher at the cutting edge of the contemporary discussion.

Текст от CORDIS, на английски · Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз

Цел на проекта

This project’s overall objective is to use state of the art research in the formal theory of knowledge to advance our understanding of the scope and limits of metaphysics. Specifically, the project will argue that the most important threat to the value of metaphysics comes from epistemic arguments given by Carnap, and that responding to these arguments requires drawing on considerations from formal epistemology. The master argument that will focus this project draws on Carnap's (1928) epistemic critique of metaphysics:1. No possible evidence can justify a metaphysical statement.2. If no possible evidence can justify a metaphysical statement then we can have no justification to believe a metaphysical statement.Conclusion: We can have no justification to believe a metaphysical statement.The deliverables will be six papers published in leading journals. The first will argue that critiques of metaphysics based on semantics do not succeed. The second will argue that epistemic criticisms of metaphysics are effective, specifically Carnap's. The third will defend premise 1, arguing that the rationalist renaissance of recent years has done little to undermine the relevant empiricist thesis. The fourth defends premise 2 as applied to the question of ontology (‘what exists?’), arguing that the non-empirical considerations used by objective Bayesians can be applied to metaphysics. The fifth criticizes premise 2 as applied to the question of modality (‘what it necessary?’), arguing that non-empirical considerations cannot help us determine the gap between the necessary and the contingent. The sixth develops the anti-realist theory of modality that follows, arguing that it makes best sense of the core intuitions of both sides of the argument.These deliverables will expand the ER's core strengths into metaphysics, re-integrate him into Europe and establish him as one of the leading European experts in formal epistemology and the methodology of metaphysics.

Оригинален текст от CORDIS (на английски).

Участници

UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS · LeedsКоординаторОбединеното кралство