H2020Индивидуална стипендия2017–2019

IEA · International Environmental Agreements -An Integrated Approach

„Хоризонт 2020“ — Действия „Мария Склодовска-Кюри“

Период: 2017-07-01 → 2019-06-30
Финансиране от ЕС: 112 927 €
Участници: 1
Схема: MSCA-IF

Линиите свързват координатора с партньорите.

Накратко на български

Международните екологични споразумения се анализират чрез модели, които обясняват защо някои държави ги подписват, а други не. Това помага да се разбере как финансови трансфери или различното технологично развитие на страните могат да увеличат броя на участниците в тези договори.

Този кратък обзор е генериран от изкуствен интелект

Кратко обяснение, генерирано от езиков модел по текста на CORDIS. Оригиналът е по-долу.

Резултати накратко

International Environmental Agreements -An Integrated Approach

The study of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) has taken centre stage during the recent years in an effort to develop theoretical models that both explain reality, i.e., why IEAs are ratified by a fraction of the total number of countries, and identify ways in which the number of signatories could increase. Our work over the past twelve months has been extremely successful on both fronts. In other words, we were able to generalize and solve existing models as well as to identify instruments that enhance cooperation, transfers and issue linkage. The scientific objectives of the project, can be grouped in two broad streams: (i) the purely theoretical and abstract one where solution concepts are being built and (ii) the also theoretical but applied in context one where the particular IEA models are being built. Both scientific objectives have been met successfully. In particular, we formalized a new stability condition that captures a forward-looking decision-making process. Our results show that if identical countries behave farsightedly then the stable agreements are much larger than those the previous models supported. An original equilibrium notion was also constructed in a second paper in order to analyse the complex model at hand. Large part of the work of this second paper has been presented in a conference in July 2017 and is to be circulated as a working paper. So far, in the literature all countries were assumed to be homogeneous. One of our models further extended this aspect to accommodate heterogeneous countries. Heterogeneity among countries captured not only different technologies but also different perceptions over environmental protection.Moreover, we extended the model by introducing mediation such as transfers. We demonstrated that intermediaries can use transfer to enhance cooperation and thus decrease emissions. Issue linkage in the form of trade agreements and R&D cooperation either as a punishment or as a reward has already been brought up in the literature but only within the framework of bilateral negotiations. We explored further the effects of issue linkage within a multilateral negotiation setting. This was done by enriching the choice set of each economic agent.

Текст от CORDIS, на английски · Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз

Цел на проекта

Transbountary environmental pollution constitutes a major challenge in international collaboration. Although global cooperation and coordination can benefit everyone involved, each country would like to unilaterally free ride on everyone else’s efforts. A number of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) are drafted and ratified to this date, in an effort to address this problem. While the process is ongoing it is widely accepted that IEAs are either of small size (in terms of signatories) or non-enforceable.The proposed study will provide a framework that captures the current situation better than the models in the existing literature, by explicitly formalizing the negotiation process underlining the formation of an IEA. Moreover, it will formalize the linkage between environmental problems and other political and economical issues (e.g. trade agreements and R&D). Shedding light on the issues that surround and on the mechanisms that generate the constitution of an IEA will assist inidentifying strategies and tools that can enhance IEA participation and enforceability in the future.IEAs have been studied during the recent years in an effort to both explain why they are ratified by a fraction of the total number of countries, and suggest ways in which the number of signatories could increase. In order to capture the interdependence among countries' choices and the widely spread externalities that lead to the strategic behaviour of countries involved in negotiations of IEAs we use game theory as the tool of analysis.

Оригинален текст от CORDIS (на английски).

Участници

UNIVERSITY OF MACEDONIA · ThessalonikiКоординаторГърция