H2020Индивидуална стипендия2020–2022

SchoolFlex · School choice under transferable capacities

„Хоризонт 2020“ — Действия „Мария Склодовска-Кюри“

Период: 2020-10-01 → 2022-09-30
Финансиране от ЕС: 191 149 €
Участници: 1
Схема: MSCA-IF

Линиите свързват координатора с партньорите.

Накратко на български

Системите за разпределяне на места в училищата се анализират, за да се види дали гъвкавотото подреждане на предпочитанията помага да се избегне манипулирането на избора. Това е важно, за да се разбере как да се постигне по-справедливо разпределение на ресурсите.

Този кратък обзор е генериран от изкуствен интелект

Кратко обяснение, генерирано от езиков модел по текста на CORDIS. Оригиналът е по-долу.

Резултати накратко

School choice under transferable capacities

In a free market economy, price is the most popular mechanism for allocating goods and services. However, many of us will find it repugnant or unethical to put for sale human organs for transplantation or public-school seats. Such resources are rather efficiently allocated by matching them to participants’ preferences via a centralized matching system. One of the challenges of the designer is to elicit the true preferences from participants and at the same time prevent participants from gaming the system. Gaming would undermine confidences of this type of market solution. Unfortunately, in some highly publicized cases, it has proved possible to game matching systems. Usually, gaming benefit participants who have sufficient information and understanding about the allocation system to take advantage of. Despite efforts to construct ‘tamper-proof’ mechanisms to restrict opportunities for gaming and unfair advantage, it’s become clear that most mechanisms can still be manipulated under certain circumstances and to varying degrees. It has been, for example, observed in school choice design. For various reasons, admissions authorities limit the number of schools that each student may list, thus putting constraints on rankings. Ranking constraints introduces an opportunity for gaming. Over time, authorities tend to adopt more flexible rankings system in which students can rank more schools. The goal of this project was to study the relationship between gaming (manipulation) and flexible rankings as well as its fairness implication.

Текст от CORDIS, на английски · Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз

Цел на проекта

Public schools are the largest providers of education in many countries. In the vast majority of the OECD countries, more than two third of secondary students were educated in public schools in 2016. The ""non-market"" feature of admissions to this type of schools calls for a careful design of how to allocate seats to students. In recent decades, school choice has appeared as a promising alternative. Centralized public school choice is a system that allocates public school seats to students by taking into account their preferences over various schools. Each school has a fixed capacity and a priority order that is determined by law. Stability --- essentially about respecting priorities --- and efficiency --- maximizing students' welfare --- have been the guiding principles for public school choice design. Yet, it is impossible to satisfy both principles. However, the Gale-Shapley student proposing deferred acceptance is a second best solution, being the student-optimal stable (constraint) matching mechanism. Nevertheless, the welfare loss is considerable. I observed that this is in part due to the fact that capacities are assumed to be rigid. I interpret them as (class size) ideal capacities because, in practice, schools are flexible so that they can add a few seats to their reported capacities. In theory, this flexibility can be exploited to mitigate the welfare loss in deferred acceptance. The flexibility is subjected to not adding more seat to the whole system, so it is a transfer of capacities. This project aims at designing a student-optimal stable matching mechanism under transferable capacities. More specifically, I will study such a mechanism and empirically evaluate the welfare gains of transferable capacities. I will also study the feasibility of stability and full efficiency. Such a mechanism will help improve the assignment of public school seats to students in many cities around the world, including Boston, many cities in England and Hungary.""

Оригинален текст от CORDIS (на английски).

Участници

UNIVERSITE DE LAUSANNE · LAUSANNEКоординаторШвейцария