Elite Defections · The Origins of Elite Defections
„Хоризонт 2020“ — Действия „Мария Склодовска-Кюри“
- Период
- 2022-04-01 → 2025-03-31
- Финансиране от ЕС
- 271 733 €
- Участници
- 2
- Схема
- MSCA-IF
Линиите свързват координатора с партньорите.
Накратко на български
Причините за напускането на властта от влиятелни личности в авторитарни режими, например когато висши officials преминат в опозицията. Това помага да се разбере как се променят управлението и отношенията между политическите групи.
Кратко обяснение, генерирано от езиков модел по текста на CORDIS. Оригиналът е по-долу.
Резултати накратко
The Origins of Elite Defections
When and why do elites withdraw their support from authoritarian ruling coalitions? Elite exits are a puzzling phenomenon to study in comparative politics because they can often trigger regime transformations. Classic and contemporary comparative research shows that when elites exit a ruling coalition, regimes may come under stress. Elites who voluntarily exit may negotiate with moderate groups in the opposition, lead a regime transformation on their own, and/or craft movements that attract unhappy voters. To prevent this from happening, incumbents typically put in place a series of measures, including spoils, paths to career advancement, protection, but also surveillance, repression, and coup-proofing strategies. Nonetheless, despite these systematic efforts, exits do at times happen. This project addressed when and why elite exits occur. In this way, this project advanced our understanding on the inner workings of authoritarian ruling coalitions, the drivers of internal transformations, and dynamics between opposing groups. It also provided new empirical data on the dynamics of ruling cohorts.
Текст от CORDIS, на английски · Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз
Цел на проекта
Autocrats cannot rule alone. To guarantee their personal safety/regime survival, they often build authoritarian parties/coalitions. In return for their services and support, authoritarian elites receive benefits, privileges, spoils and protection. This support, however, is not unconditional and autocrats know so. Therefore, they have to constantly watch over these elites -and resort to blackmail, repression, or jailing- to prevent splits and/or spin-off movements that could lead to regime collapse. In spite of the uncertainty and risks that come with defections, including losing privileges, benefits or protection, some elites still choose to break away. Why does this happen? Several studies have looked at the role of defectors in transition processes and have tried to answer why defections occur. They have found that spoil-sharing, institutional framework, co-optation, repression, economic crisis or liberalization (or lack thereof) can promote elite cohesion or, in turn, incentivize defections. While this scholarship makes important contributions, several questions remain. Given that defections do not always occur at once, what explains defections over time? To what extent do linkages to the opposition and their capacity to absorb defectors matter? Does international pressure hinder or promote defections? Does regime popularity inhibit defections? By using quantitative and qualitative tools and a cross-regional comparative approach, this project titled “The Origins of Elite Defections” will address these questions. So far there has been no systematic research on defectors in Latin America that combines both qualitative (elite interviews) and quantitative analysis (creation of original database on defectors), with a cross-regional comparison using African cases, such as Ghana and Uganda. In doing so, this project will shed light on the patterns and timing of defections thereby contributing to a better understanding of authoritarian demise and survival.
Оригинален текст от CORDIS (на английски).
Участници
- THE CHANCELLOR, MASTERS AND SCHOLARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD · OxfordКоординаторОбединеното кралство
- Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars · Washiington DcСъединени щати
Връзки
Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз