MVG · Moral Vagueness in a Mind-Independent World
„Хоризонт 2020“ — Действия „Мария Склодовска-Кюри“
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- 2022-05-01 → 2025-06-09
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Накратко на български
Моралната неяснота изследва границата между допустимото и недопустимото, например дали е приемливо да оставим дете без надзор за една секунда, но не и за десет минути. Това помага да се разбере дали тези граници са обективни факти или просто са неопределени.
Кратко обяснение, генерирано от езиков модел по текста на CORDIS. Оригиналът е по-долу.
Резултати накратко
Moral Vagueness in a Mind-Independent World
Suppose that one is watching one’s seven-year-old son play in the city park. This claim seems to be clearly true: it is morally permissible to divert one’s attention from him for one second. At the same time, this principle also seems to be clearly true: if it is morally permissible to divert one’s attention from him for n number of seconds, then it is morally permissible to divert one’s attention for n + 1 second. By modus ponens and continuous application of the principle, we can generate a sorites paradox to the apparently absurd conclusion that it is morally permissible to divert one’s attention for, say, six hundred seconds (ten minutes). The ease with which we can generate sorites paradoxes for ‘morally permissible’ and other moral terms is strong evidence that there is moral vagueness. The existence of moral vagueness raises the question of what its source is—the source question. Extending theories of vagueness in general to the moral domain, two leading answers emerge. According to one, moral vagueness has its source in a kind of uncertainty: when it is vague whether it is morally permissible to perform a certain act, there is a fact of the matter about whether performing it is morally permissible but it is unknowable. This is moral epistemicism. According to another, moral vagueness has its source in a kind of indeterminacy: when it is vague whether it is morally permissible to perform a certain act, there is no fact of the matter about whether performing it is morally permissible. This is moral indeterminism. Which of moral epistemicism and moral indeterminism (if any) provides the right answer to the source question? The overall objective of this project was to show that, at least conditional on robust moral realism being true, moral epistemicism and moral indeterminism have distinct and significant practical implications—that is, distinct and significant implications for what one ought to do when one is acting under moral vagueness. If confirmed, this hypothesis would show that it matters from a practical perspective—as opposed to a merely theoretical one—which (if any) of those theories of moral vagueness is true.
Текст от CORDIS, на английски · Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз
Цел на проекта
Sometimes, there is vagueness about whether it is morally permissible to perform a certain act—moral vagueness. This raises a question: what is the source of moral vagueness? To approach this question, it is standard to assume that, as many hold, we live in a robustly realist moral world—a mind-independent world. The central hypothesis of this project is that if we live in such a world, then the two leading accounts of the source of moral vagueness—moral epistemicism and (what might be called) moral indeterminacism—have distinct and significant implications for what we ought to do, all things considered, when confronted with moral vagueness. This, it will be argued, has been overlooked in previous research, and it promises both to evade a serious worry at the heart of the search for the source of moral vagueness and to set a new path for finding the source. The main objective of the project is to confirm that hypothesis. The project combines the expertise of the Experienced Researcher (ER) in vagueness and decision-making with the internationally-recognised expertise of the supervisor (Matti Eklund) in vagueness and meta-ethics, and the strengths of the host organisation (Uppsala University) in theoretical and practical philosophy. The project will greatly improve the ER’s career prospects, especially given the excellent match between the expertise of the supervisor and that of the ER and the consequent training and mentorship that the ER will receive. Meanwhile, in light of the project’s engagement with issues that connect many sub-disciplines of philosophy, the host organisation will benefit from the ER’s inter-sub-disciplinary contribution to its research activities and the networking opportunities that will ensue.
Оригинален текст от CORDIS (на английски).
Участници
- UPPSALA UNIVERSITET · UppsalaКоординаторШвеция
Връзки
Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз