DOA · Duties and Obligations in Arguing. A Kantian Approach to Argumentation

Линиите свързват координатора с партньорите.

Накратко на български

Цел на проекта

How strongly should we defend our beliefs when arguing, and how much respect should we show for the beliefs of others, even if we disagree with them? The aim of DOA is to set out and describe epistemic duties associated with argumentation, with a focus on those that apply to the exchange of reasons in the public sphere, where disagreement concerning political, economic, and societal issues prevails. DOA addresses how we should behave when actively conveying our beliefs in arguments, and how carefully we should evaluate other people's arguments and the beliefs they convey when accepting or rejecting them. Recently, the theoretical framework concerning epistemic norms for arguing has been characterised by discussions revolving around intellectual or argumentative virtues, such as intellectual honesty, critical thinking and open-mindedness. DOA proposes an alternative theoretical framework based on duties relating to the linguistic acts of convincing and accepting an argument, which are established independently of an individual arguer's virtuous behaviour. Given the specific features of the norms of Kant's ethics of belief, which allow for different kinds of justification for assent, the epistemic duties set out by DOA have the potential for protecting the specificity of the individuals' beliefs, while providing a solid normative intersubjective foundation for argumentation from an epistemic standpoint. Their application should, in particular, help to combat injustices that are exposed in the public sphere.

Оригинален текст от CORDIS (на английски).

Участници

• UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDI DI TORINO · TorinoКоординаторИталия
• TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY · Princeton, NjСъединени щати
• UNIVERSITE DE FRIBOURG · FribourgШвейцария

Връзки

• Виж в CORDIS
• DOI: 10.3030/101284655