FP6Индивидуална стипендия2006–2008

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING · Financial accounting studies on the manipulation of shareholder¿s perception of results via disclosure and changes in the useful life of assets

6РП — Действия „Мария Кюри“

Период
2006-10-01 → 2008-09-30
Финансиране от ЕС
80 000 €
Участници
1
Схема
EIF

Линиите свързват координатора с партньорите. За проекти отпреди 2014 г. CORDIS не винаги дава точни координати. Тези точки са на ниво град или държава.

Накратко на български

Финансовото отчитане и използването на показатели, които не следват общоприетите счетоводни стандарти (като EBITDA), се анализират за влиянието им върху инвеститорите. Това помага да се разбере дали подобни методи за представяне на резултатите могат да подведат акционерите.

Този кратък обзор е генериран от изкуствен интелект

Кратко обяснение, генерирано от езиков модел по текста на CORDIS. Оригиналът е по-долу.

Резултати накратко

Final Activity Report Summary - FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING (Financial accounting studies on the manipulation of shareholder?s perception of results via disclosure and changes in the useful life of assets)

My research focuses on understanding the relation between managers' disclosures and financial markets. Specifically, I analyse non-GAAP financial measures, i.e., financial measures that are calculated by managers in such a way that they do not follow the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The disclosure of these numbers is affected by several factors. One of them is Regulation G, a rule created by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States of America. This objective of this rule was to reduce disclosures that could mislead investors. One of my co-authored papers studies how the quality of firms' corporate governance interacts with the impact of this rule. First, we find that firms with weaker corporate governance mechanisms disclosed potentially more misleading earnings adjustments prior to the SEC regulatory intervention. Second, after the SEC intervention this difference between firms with weak and strong corporate governance narrowed. Finally, the results suggest that investors were not misled by non-GAAP earnings disclosures, even those made before the SEC intervention by firms with weak corporate governance. But in Europe there is no equivalent of Regulation G. Thus, in a separate co-authored paper, I study the non-GAAP financial measures disclosed in the earnings announcements press releases of the 500 largest European companies. Our findings reveal that the disclosure of EBIT/EBITDA is much more common in Europe than in the US. Furthermore, the average number of non-GAAP financial measures per press release, when these disclosures occur, is three. What measures are disclosed and how much emphasis is given to them varies based on several firms' characteristics: size, performance, leverage, corporate governance practices, country, and industry affiliation. Finally, only 35% of the non-GAAP financial measures are explained by managers, but that this percentage has been growing

Текст от CORDIS, на английски · Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз

Цел на проекта

Managers can change the market's perception about a firm's performance through specific actions. One of these actions is the disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures and external explanations for the final results obtained. Another one of these actions is the manipulation of GAAP earnings. With my research, I will extend the literature on non-GAAP financial measures in several ways.First, using a hand-collected set of data about the disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures by the S&P500 firms between 2001 and 2003, I will study the impact of institutional ownership on the disclosure and valuation of non-GAAP financial measures. Second, I will collect data about the disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures in the UK and compare the determinants and impact of these measures between the two countries, taking into consideration the different regulatory settings.Thirdly, I will study how analysts determine what items should be included in the non-GAAP earnings they disclose and whether conference call ac cess impacts the calculation of these numbers. Complementary, I will examine how investors react to some of the external explanations that managers give in the earnings announcement for bad performance (like mentions of September 11 and the Iraq war).Finally, I will analyze the level and perverseness of the manipulation of the useful life of assets, via changes in amortization and depreciation, as a way to alter earnings. This research will allow me to continue the line of study I initiated with my dissertation paper, entitled 'SEC interventions and the frequency and usefulness of non-GAAP financial measures', which is now forthcoming in Review of Accounting Studies.Furthermore, it will allow me to extend my research into two other topics: external explanations and the manipulation of earnings. This will contribute to a smooth re-integration in Europe - more specifically, into the Faculdade de Economia of Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal).

Оригинален текст от CORDIS (на английски).

Участници

  • UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA, FACULDADE DE ECONOMIA (FEUNL) · LISBOAКоординаторНиво градПортугалия

Връзки

Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз