FP7Реинтеграция2010–2014

COINTRPE · When Battlefield Success Leads to Effective Counterinsurgency: Searching for a Cross-Regional Theory

7РП — „Хора“ (Действия „Мария Кюри“)

Период
2010-11-01 → 2014-10-31
Финансиране от ЕС
100 000 €
Участници
1
Схема
MC-IRG

Линиите свързват координатора с партньорите. За проекти отпреди 2014 г. CORDIS не винаги дава точни координати. Тези точки са на ниво град или държава.

Накратко на български

Условията, при които военните успехи срещу вътрешни бунтове водят до реална победа, се анализират чрез примери от Турция и Перу. Това помага да се разбере защо чисто военните методи понякога са ефективни, а в други случаи не успяват да спрат конфликта.

Този кратък обзор е генериран от изкуствен интелект

Кратко обяснение, генерирано от езиков модел по текста на CORDIS. Оригиналът е по-долу.

Резултати накратко

When Battlefield Success Leads to Effective Counterinsurgency: Searching for a Cross-Regional Theory

As the frequency of interstate wars is decreasing and violent non-state actors’ challenge to states is becoming more common, the subject of counterinsurgency is increasing in prominence. Especially the current counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as increasing references to Al Qaeda as a global insurgency, have contributed to the growing importance of counterinsurgency. However, scholars have, so far, failed to pay sufficient attention to the causes, conduct, and the consequences of counterinsurgencies. This research project provides an answer to the question why sometimes battlefield success against the insurgents leads to an overall success in counterinsurgency and brings an end to the internal conflict, while other times it fails to achieve this outcome. Although states tend to resort to military methods to eliminate insurgencies, these methods, in fact, have a mixed record of success. Even when states inflict significant damage on the insurgents militarily, this does not necessarily bring an overall success in counterinsurgency. Thus, the major objective of this project is to identify the conditions under which military methods are more or less likely to bring effective results in counterinsurgency. In this research project, Dr. Pusane, first, carried out a comparative case study of Turkey and Peru regarding their struggle with insurgencies, namely the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and the Shining Path, respectively. She aimed to understand the major reasons why Peru’s military campaign against the Shining Path and the arrest of the Shining Path leader in 1992 led to the significant weakening of this organization, whereas the PKK insurgency was able to persist even after Turkey’s military victory against the PKK and the subsequent arrest of the PKK leader in 1999. Research findings show that the major reason lies in the Turkish governments’ failure to sufficiently address two key aspects of low intensity conflicts, namely the need to disintegrate the insurgency’s organizational structure and the need to deplete its support among the local population. Second, Dr. Pusane applied the findings of the Turkey and Peru case studies on three additional cases, namely Britain’s struggle with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elaam (LTTE), and Russia’s military confrontation with the Chechens. These cases represent different parts of the world where states inflicted significant damage on the insurgents through the use of military force, but experienced different outcomes in terms of overall success and failure in counterinsurgency. A detailed analysis of these experiences demonstrated that the findings of the Turkey-Peru comparative case study can be applied also to these additional cases. This is an important outcome with implications in theory and policy. The research findings based on five different country experiences demonstrate that counterinsurgency is a multidimensional endeavor and military methods in counterinsurgency cannot be successful unless they go hand in hand with additional political, social, and economic measures that target the insurgency’s organizational structure and aim to win the support of the local population. Although it is widely known that military methods have mixed results in counterinsurgency, states tend to resort to these methods extensively. Therefore, it is important to demonstrate scientifically the conditions under which battlefield success is more or less likely to lead to an overall success in counterinsurgency. In the counterinsurgency literature, which is dominated by historical and prescriptive accounts, this theoretical and systematic study of counterinsurgency constitutes a significant contribution. These findings are not only valuable for the academic community, but also crucial for informing the governments and the society in general. Throughout this research project, Dr. Pusane successfully re-integrated into the European Research Area. The Marie Curie International Reintegration Grant (IRG) contributed immensely to Dr. Pusane’s transformation from a Ph.D. student into an independent researcher. She has a stable assistant professor position, an active research agenda and she is on her way towards associate professorship in Turkey.

Текст от CORDIS, на английски · Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз

Цел на проекта

As the frequency of interstate wars is decreasing and violent non-state actors’ challenge to states is becoming more common, the subject of counterinsurgency is increasing in prominence for scholars and policy makers both in Europe and in other parts of the world. Especially the current counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as increasing references to Al Qaeda as a global insurgency have contributed to the growing importance of counterinsurgency.This research asks the question why sometimes battlefield success against the insurgents leads to an overall success in counterinsurgency and brings an end to the internal conflict, while other times it fails to achieve this outcome. Although states tend to resort to coercive (i.e., military) methods in order to eliminate insurgencies, these methods, in fact, have a mixed record of success. Even when states seem to inflict significant damage on the insurgents militarily, this does not necessarily bring an overall success in counterinsurgency.In light of a comparative case study of Turkey and Peru and the analysis of a number of additional cases, this research aims to identify ways in which states can most effectively deal with insurgent organizations and end conflict and violence within their borders. It proposes that in order to eliminate an insurgency, it is more important to find the best method that directly responds to the characteristics, goals, and external connections of the particular insurgent organization challenging the state than to focus on various military, economic, social, and cultural methods based on their generic advantages and disadvantages.

Оригинален текст от CORDIS (на английски).

Участници

  • ISIK UNIVERSITY · SILE ISTANBULКоординаторНиво държаваТурция

Връзки

Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз