UNITED, DIVIDED · United we stand devided we fall: How the web of political institutions influence legislators' behaviour

United we stand devided we fall: How the web of political institutions influence legislators' behaviour

The Marie Curie International Reintegration grant (IRG) support has been quint-essential to my professional development and enabled me to further secure my tenure track position at the Political Science department at Tel-Aviv University. In my grant I proposed examining what affect politicians' decision to defect from their party line and vote against their party's wishes. I specifically theorize about the interaction between electoral systems, intra-party candidate selection processes, and the often neglected institution of parliamentary cameral procedures and its effect on legislators' behaviour. The overall goals for the project include the collection of original data on parliamentary cameral procedures; the creation of a classification scheme to analyze parliamentary cameral procedures in a comparative way; and the use of a combination of cutting edge methodological tools to empirically test the theory concerning the interactive effect of institutions on legislators' behavior. These scientific goals were mostly achieved during the four year period: I have created a classification scheme, which consists of 59 questions that enables cross-national classification of parliaments' standing orders. I have collected and analyzed cameral procedures for 15 countries, while within each country I collected procedures for at least three different periods (and for most countries much more than that, for example we have documented every procedural amendment in the Israeli Knesset form 1967 till 2007); I used cutting edge methodology and original data-sets to published numerous articles in leading peer reviewed journals and currently have additional 5 manuscripts under review. In my American Journal of Political Science paper (co-authored with Rosas and Haptenstohl) we present a modeling framework that extends the most widely used method to analyze legislators' voting behavior so it incorporates strategic abstentions and absences. We show the usefulness of modeling these types of missing votes via both simulations and real-world data form the American Congress and the United Nation's general assembly. Within the American context we show how modeling strategic abstention changes scholars as well as the publics' perceptions about a Senator's ideological leaning. Specifically, the National Journals analyzed prior to the 2004 presidential elections, 62 key votes taken by senators, and concluded that Kerry is the most liberal senator. These conclusions were used by Kerry's opponents to portray him as an ideological extremist. However once we model Kerry abstentions and absences as strategic we find that Kerry seems much less liberal than we previously thought. These results extends beyond the Kerry case, for example Obama prior to the 2008 presidential campaign was argued to be the most liberal senator, based on analyses that once again ignored his multiple abstentions and absences. Taking into account strategic decision to abstain or absent oneself from a vote will enable scholars, news reporters and the public at large to get a better picture about politicians' ideological leaning, and facilitate a more educated political debate during the electoral campaign. In my West European Politics article I show how changes in selection processes that triggered personalized behavior by politicians led the government to amend the parliament's procedures so as to gain better control over individual parliament members' behavior. I illustrate this theory using the Israeli Knesset while analyzing every procedural amendment accepted on the Knesset's floor from 1967 till 2007. I specifically show how the changes to selection procedures led to an increase in the volume of procedural amendments, and that the vast majority of these amendments were directly at restraining Knesset Members' reluctant, undisciplined behavior. My other publications focus as well on the conditional effect of elections and selections on legislators' behaviour, and how electoral systems and selection processes affect intra-cameral procedures. I also have various manuscripts currently under review. The analysis conducted thus far demonstrate that electoral systems and intra-party candidate selection procedures interact with one another in the effect on legislators' behavior. It also demonstrate the cameral procedures are a strategic tool governing parties may use to gain control over legislators, when external institutions, such as electoral systems and selection procedures incentivizes personalization. Once all the data is classified I anticipate finding that the three major institutions of electoral systems, candidate selection processes and parliamentary cameral procedures interact with one another in their effect on legislators' tendency to vote the party's line. As politics becomes more and more polarized (see the U.S politics, and even the U.K); as politicians emphasize to a greater extent their personal behavior at the expanse of the collective unified party record; and as countries and political systems face more and more demands manifested and characterized by economic and social difficulties, the way the political system reacts to these challenges depends upon the way parties and legislators behave. The degree to which party leaders and Prime Ministers are able to control their parties and coalitions is an important factor in explaining their abilities to cope well with the difficult times we are facing. The results from my project funded by the IRG may inform politicians about the institutional structure that is best suited for maintaining high degree of party discipline, and hence governmental stability and policy durability.

Текст от CORDIS, на английски · Данни: CORDIS, © Европейски съюз